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Abstract
This study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers, each of them
facing a newsvendor problem, m warehouses and a supplier. The retailers are
supplied with a single product via some warehouses. In these warehouses, the
ordered amounts of goods of these retailers become available after some lead time.
At the time that the goods arrive at the warehouses, demand realizations are
known by the retailers. The retailers can increase their expected joint proﬁts by
coordinating their orders and making allocations after demand realization. For
this setting, we consider an associated cooperative game between the retailers. We
show that this associated cooperative game has a nonempty core. Finally, we study
a variant of this game, where the retailers are allowed to leave unsold goods at the
warehouses.
KEYWORDS: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT, NEWSVENDOR, WARE-
HOUSE, GAME THEORY, BALANCEDNESS.
1This paper is also issued as Beta Research School Working Paper (WP 111). Beta is the inter-
university research school of Technische Universiteit Eindhoven and University of Twente.
11 Introduction
Recent developments in information and communication technology are changing the
common way of doing business in distribution systems. Being able to access information
of each other, ﬁrms may beneﬁt from cooperative actions. For example, consider a
retailer who is faced with a higher demand of a product than it has available on hand.
If this retailer could ﬁnd another retailer with excess stock close-by within an acceptable
leadtime, it might be beneﬁcial for both retailers to transship products to satisfy the
excess demand. With the help of information technology, these retailers could beneﬁt
from the well-known concept of inventory pooling even if their stocks are not kept in the
same physical location.
We consider a distribution system consisting of a group of retailers selling a single
product in their local markets. Because of long manufacturing and transportation lead
times (long supplier lead time), retailers have to decide on the order quantities before
knowing the actual demand. For instance, shipments for fashion products such as running
shoes from manufacturing facilities in Asia to markets in Europe and North-America have
such long supplier lead times. How might the retailers beneﬁt if they could be able to
reallocate their orders after the demand realization?
To study this situation, we analyze a general distribution system where there are
warehouses in addition to the retailers. The warehouses represent the physical areas
(like harbors, regional distribution centers of the supplier, private warehouses where
the retailers hire space to stock their goods because of physical constraints in the stores)
where the ordered products are sent and available at the time that the demand is realized.
The retailers might increase their joint proﬁt by reallocating the available goods in the
warehouses. The warehouses can also be considered as cross-docks, which do not hold any
inventory. Eppen and Schrage (1981) consider a similar distribution system with cross-
docks and make the following interpretation of the assumption that cross-docks do not
hold inventory. The goods are physically shipped directly from the supplier to the cross-
docks, where the orders are broken into smaller lots and shipped to the retailers. They
investigate optimal order up to policies in such a system in a multi period framework and
show how the system beneﬁts from inventory pooling. We analyze the system as a single
period model. Furthermore, we use cooperative game theory to answer the question
whether it is beneﬁcial for each retailer to cooperate.
Application of game theory in supply chains is not a new issue in the literature.
The literature related with game theory can roughly be divided into cooperative and
noncooperative. There are several tracks of interest in the literature using noncooperative
game theory. One track of interest in this ﬁeld is investigation of coordination mechanisms
(like contracts) under horizontal and vertical competition. The main question is whether
the proposed mechanism provides a solution that maximizes the total supply chain proﬁt
in a Stackelberg game setting or under Nash equilibrium. We refer to Cachon (1999, 2003)
and Lariviere (1999) for reviews on analysis of contracts. The other track of interest is
stock wars, where the retailers are ﬁghting for limited supply of product. Cachon and
Lariviere (1999) study a system where the supplier has a limited capacity and the retailer
can aﬀect the quantity that they will get by changing their order quantity. In this setting
they investigate the performance of an allocation mechanism under diﬀerent information
scenarios like the retailers truthfully declaring their demand realization or keeping this
private information for themselves. Another application of noncooperative game theory is
to investigate the performance of some cooperation mechanisms where the players behave
according to their individual preferences. G¨ ull¨ u et al. (2003) consider a decentralized
supply chain under partial cooperation where the retailers can readjust their initial orders
2(without changing the total order size) having more information of demand after some
lead time so that both retailers can improve their expected costs. In our paper, we do
not deal with the noncooperative behaviors of the players.
There are some diﬀerences between analysis using noncooperative game theory and
ones using cooperative game theory. In the application of noncooperative game theory,
it is assumed that each player acts individually according to its objective and preference,
and usually the mechanisms (contracts) are investigated. One of the main focuses of con-
cern is whether these mechanisms work well enough in providing coordination (maximum
proﬁt that the total system can obtain) under a competitive framework. In contrast, co-
operative game theory assumes that binding agreements can be made between players on
the advantage of the whole system. One of the main questions is whether the cooperation
is stable, i.e. there is an allocation of the total beneﬁt of the system among the players
such that no group of players would like to leave the system. Cooperative game theory
oﬀers the concept of core as a direct answer to that question. Nonemptiness of the core
means that there exists at least one allocation of the joint proﬁts among the players such
that no group of players has an incentive to leave.
We model our system in a newsvendor setting. The newsvendor models are well known
single period models used especially for the products with high perishability or short life
cycles. Initial applications appeared in modelling ordering decisions of newsvendors and
in the fashion industry. The decreasing life cycles in the high tech industry, such as
personal computers and mobile phones, extended the application areas of these models.
For the method to compute the optimal solution of newsvendor problems see Silver et
al. (1998) and see Khouja (1999) for a review.
In a newsvendor environment, retailers can increase their total proﬁt by pooling their
stock. The basic cooperation appears as follows: The retailers give a joint order and use
this quantity to satisfy the total demand they are faced with. In this way, they can beneﬁt
from perfect allocation of the ordered quantity to the demands realized and coordination
of the orders. Hartman et al. (2000) consider the game in the above mentioned setting,
in which the value of the group of retailers is their optimal proﬁt if they jointly determine
an order size. In this study, they prove that the newsvendor game has a nonempty core
for speciﬁc demand distributions of the retailers. M¨ uller et al. (2002) and Slikker et
al. (2001) independently come up with a more powerful result, namely that the core of
the newsvendor games are nonempty regardless of the joint distribution of the random
demands. Slikker et al. (2003) make several generalizations to this newsvendor setting.
First, they consider non-anonymous wholesale and customer prices. In their model, orders
are shipped directly to the retailers. Reallocation -after demand becomes known- is then
subject to transshipment costs (for the lateral transshipment). Finally, they comment on
the convexity of the game and prove that the cores of the associated games are nonempty.
We consider two cost components. The ﬁrst one is transportation cost from the
supplier to the warehouses. Besides transportation cost, this cost may include the pur-
chasing cost of the products. The second cost component is the transportation cost from
the warehouses to the retailers. In previous work, it has been assumed that the real-
location takes place at the retailer level. However, our setting covers a broad range of
situations in which the reallocation of the ordered products could be made even if the
ordered products are somewhere between the supplier and the retailer when the demands
are realized at the retailers. Associated with this newsvendor situation, we formulate two
coalitional games, which slightly diﬀer from each other in terms of allocation problems
considered. In one of the games, we force all the units to be sent to the retailers and in
the other game we let the system leave the leftovers in the warehouses. We prove that
these games have non-empty cores.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce some
preliminaries on cooperative game theory to make the reader familiar with the basic
cooperative game theory concepts. Then, in section 3, we introduce the general model and
we deﬁne the ﬁrst associated cooperative game (forced allocation game). Additionally,
we state our ﬁrst main result. After discussing the second associated game (relaxed
allocation game) and showing that this game has a nonempty core in section 4, we
conclude our paper with some remarks in section 5.
2 Preliminaries on Cooperative Game Theory
Here, we give a brief introduction to cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory
covers the problem setting where diﬀerent players act cooperatively to reach a common
goal. Let N be a ﬁnite set of players, N = {1,...,n}. A subset of N is called a coalition
and denoted by S. A function v, assigning a value v(S) for every coalition S ⊆ N
with v(∅) = 0, is called a characteristic function. The value v(S) is interpreted as the
maximum total proﬁt that coalition S can obtain through cooperation. Assuming that
the beneﬁt of a coalition S can be transferred between the players of S, a pair (N,v) is
called a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game). For a game (N,v), S ⊂ N
and S 6= ∅, the subgame (S,v|S) is deﬁned by v|S(T) = v(T) for each coalition T ⊆ S.
In reality, the players are not primarily interested in beneﬁts of a coalition but in
their individual beneﬁts that they make out of that coalition. An allocation is a payoﬀ
vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ I R
N, specifying for each player i ∈ N the beneﬁt xi. An allocation x
is called eﬃcient if
P
i∈N xi = v(N) and individually rational if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N.
Individual rationality means that every player gets at least as much as what he could
obtain by staying alone. The set of all individually rational and eﬃcient allocations
constitutes the imputation set I(N,v) = {x ∈ I R
N|
P
i∈N xi = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i})
for each i ∈ N}. If this kind of rationality requirements are extended to all coalitions,
we obtain the core C(N,v) = {x ∈ I R
N|
P
i∈N xi = v(N) and
P
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for each
S ⊆ N}. The interpretation of the core is that it consists of all imputations that are
such that no group of retailers has an incentive to split oﬀ from the grand coalition N
and form a smaller coalition because they collectively receive at least as much as what
they can obtain for themselves.
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) independently made a general characterization
of games with a non-empty core by the notion of balancedness. Let us deﬁne the vector
eS for all S ⊆ N by eS
i = 1 for all i ∈ S and eS
i = 0 for all i ∈ N/S. A map
κ : 2N/{∅} → [0,1] is called a balanced map if
P
S∈2N/{∅} κ(S)eS = eN. Further, a game
(N,v) is called balanced if for every balanced map κ : 2N/{∅} → [0,1] it holds that
P
S∈2N/{∅} κ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N). The following theorem is due to Bondareva (1963) and
Shapley (1967).
Theorem 1 Let (N,v) be a TU game. Then C(N,v) 6= ∅ if and only if (N,v) is balanced.
A coalitional game (N,v) is called totally balanced if it is balanced and each of its
subgames is balanced as well.
3 The Forced Allocation Game
In this section, we introduce our model and deﬁne the associated forced allocation game.
Then, we show that the associated forced allocation game has a non-empty core.
4Consider a distribution system that consists of a supplier, m warehouses and n re-
tailers each experiencing a stochastic customer demand. Every retailer may decide on
order quantities for one or more warehouses and transship goods from these warehouses.
Assume that every retailer has to determine his order quantities, which maximizes his
expected proﬁt, before the stochastic demand is realized, as in the standard newsvendor
setting. After some lead time, the ordered amounts will be sent to the warehouses and
after the realization of demand becomes known they will be sent to the retailers in order
to satisfy the demand. The following example illustrates the newsvendor problem in a 1
warehouse-1 retailer system.
Example 3.1 Consider a distribution system consisting of one supplier, one warehouse






0 if x / ∈ {1,2}
1
2 if x = 1
1
2 if x = 2.
The retailer sells the goods at a price p = 6. The transportation cost k = 1 from the
supplier to the warehouse and the transportation cost f = 1 from the warehouse to the
retailer are charged to the retailer. While determining the optimal order quantity, the
retailer should consider two costs deﬁned in the standard newsvendor literature. The
ﬁrst one is the underage cost associated with each demand that is not satisﬁed. In
this example, this is the opportunity cost of losing a customer demand, and deﬁned by
cu = p − (f + k) = 4. The second one is the overage cost co, associated with each unit
that is not sold. Here, this is simply the total cost of sending the units from the supplier
to the retailer co = k + f = 2. It is well known that the optimal order quantity (q∗) of
the retailer is the one that satisﬁes ( cu
cu+co)-quantile of demand distribution. This results
in an optimal order quantity q∗ = 2 and expected proﬁt
π(2,X) = −2 ∗ 1 +
1
2
(6 − 2) +
1
2
(12 − 2) = 5.
3
In a situation with multiple warehouses and retailers, the retailers could increase their
total expected proﬁt just by reallocating the available quantities in the warehouses ac-
cording to demand realizations. Furthermore, they could beneﬁt more if they coordinate
their orders. In order to analyze this situation, we deﬁne a general newsvendor situa-
tion with warehouses as a tuple (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N),
where
N : Set of retailers, N := {1,...,n}
W : Set of warehouses, W := {1,...,m}
Xi : Stochastic demand at retailer i, with E[Xi] < ∞ for every i ∈ N
kw : Transportation cost of the goods from the supplier to warehouse w
including purchasing cost
fwi : Transportation cost of goods from warehouse w to retailer i
Zi ⊆ W : Non-empty set of warehouses related to retailer i
pi : Selling price of the goods at retailer i
Throughout the study, we assume that pi and fwi are nonnegative, and kw > 0 for
all i ∈ N and all w ∈ W. For notational convenience, we refer to a general newsvendor
situation with warehouses as a general newsvendor situation.
5The set of warehouses Zi, via which retailer i is supplied, is a subset of all available
warehouses W in the system. Therefore, our model covers two extreme situations. In
the ﬁrst one, every retailer has only one warehouse to provide goods from, ie., |Zi| = 1
for all i ∈ N. In the second extreme, every retailer can use all warehouses, i.e., Zi = W
for all i ∈ N. Consider a collection of retailers S ⊆ N. The coalition S is allowed to use






3 be a realization of demand vector XS = (Xi)i∈S. For notational con-
venience, we will denote this realization as the vector xS ∈ I R
N where xS
i = 0 for all
i ∈ N/S and xS
i = xi for all i ∈ S.
Let QS be the collection of possible order vectors of coalition S deﬁned by
Q
S := {q ∈ I R
W| qw = 0 for all w ∈ W/ZS and qw ≥ 0 for all w ∈ ZS}.
Suppose coalition S has order vector qS ∈ QS. An allocation of qS is a matrix









w for all w ∈ ZS.
Here, AS
wi denotes the amount of product that will be sent from warehouse w to
retailer i. Note that we do not allow transshipment from the warehouses that are not in
ZS or to retailers that are not in coalition S. Moreover, we assume that at the end of the
period all units should be transferred to the retailers. The set of all possible allocations
of an order vector qS is denoted by MS(qS) for coalition S.
The proﬁt of coalition S for order vector qS ∈ QS, demand realization xS of XS, and












































Here, hS is the total revenue minus total transportation costs from warehouses to the
retailers. Subtracting the transportation costs between supplier and the warehouses from
hS, we obtain the proﬁt P S.
In the following lemma, we show the existence of optimal allocations of order vectors
for any demand realization.
Lemma 1 Let (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N) be a general news-
vendor situation with warehouses, let S ⊆ N, let qS ∈ QS, and let xS be a demand real-
ization vector. Then there exists an allocation AS,∗(qS,xS) ∈ MS(qS) that maximizes the
proﬁt P S(·,qS,xS) of coalition S.
2We remark that two retailers may prefer not to use a speciﬁc warehouse if they act alone. How-
ever, this warehouse may be used if they cooperate, for example because of a strategic position of this
warehouse somewhere between the retailers.
3To cover some well known distributions (e.g., normal distribution), we assume that xi can take
negative values.
6Proof : Because of the deﬁnition of P S, it is suﬃcient to show that there ex-















i ) is a continuous function of
AS for given qS and xS, and the domain of hS is the compact set MS(qS), we conclude
that hS(·,qS,xS) attains its maximum. 2
The following lemma provides us with an upper bound on the absolute diﬀerence of
the values of hS with diﬀerent order quantities, which will be used to show that there
exists an optimal order quantity for each coalition S in the following theorem. First,
deﬁne kS = maxw∈ZS kw, fS = maxw∈ZS,i∈S fwi, and pS = maxi∈S pi.
Lemma 2 Let (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N) be a general news-
vendor situation with warehouses, let S ⊆ N, let xS be a demand realization vector, let
q and qmin be two order vectors in QS such that qw ≥ qmin
w for all w ∈ ZS, and let













































































The equality follows from the deﬁnition of hS. The inequality holds by pS = maxi∈S pi,
min{x,y} − min{z,y} ≤ |x − z| for all x,y,z ∈ I R, and A
S,∗
wi ≥ BS
wi for all w ∈ ZS and
i ∈ S.










































































































































From now on, we refer to hS(AS,∗,qS,xS) as rS(qS,xS). The expected proﬁt function












In the remainder of the paper, we refer to EXS[rS(qS,·)] as RS(qS,XS). In the
following theorem, we show that each coalition has an optimal order vector.
Theorem 2 Let (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N) be a general news-
vendor situation and let S ⊆ N. Then, there exists an order vector qS,∗ that maximizes
the expected proﬁt function πS(·,XS) of coalition S.
Proof : To prove this theorem, we will show that πS(·,XS) is a continuous function
of the order vectors and any order vector outside a speciﬁc compact set results in lower
expected proﬁts than the order vector with all orders equal to zero.
Let xS and q ∈ QS be a demand realization vector and an order vector respectively,
and let  > 0. Deﬁne δ = 
|W|(kS+fS+pS). Let q0 ∈ QS be such that |q − q0| < δ, where | · |























































The ﬁrst equality follows by adding and subtracting the term rS(qmin,xS). The ﬁrst
inequality holds because of the triangle inequality. The second inequality holds by Lemma
2. The second equality holds because |qw −qmin
w |+|qmin
w −q0
w| = |qw −q0
w| (which follows
8by the deﬁnition of qmin
w and the fact that at least one of |qw − qmin
w | and |qmin
w − q0
w| is









































































































≤ (kS + pS + fS)|q − q
0||W|
< (kS + pS + fS) ∗ δ ∗ |W|
= .
The ﬁrst two inequalities follow by the triangle inequality. The third inequality follows
by the deﬁnition of kS. The fourth inequality follows by (3). The ﬁfth inequality holds
since |q − q0| ≥ |qw − q0
w| for all w ∈ ZS and |W| ≥ |ZS|. We conclude that πS(·,XS) is
a continuous function of the order vector.
Now we will show that any order vector outside a speciﬁc compact set results in lower
expected proﬁt than the expected proﬁt of order vector 0, i.e., the order vector with all


















i = max{−Xi,0}4. Since for all w ∈ W we have kw > 0 by deﬁnition, aS is well
deﬁned. Then, for all q ∈ QS with qw > aS for some w ∈ ZS, say y, we have
π
S(q,X
S) ≤ −qy ∗ min
i∈S,w∈ZS













The ﬁrst inequality follows by taking a lowerbound of transportation costs of ordered
goods in the network and an upperbound of expected revenues into consideration. The






i ]. Hence, the optimal order vector exists and is an element of the compact
set {q ∈ QS|0 ≤ qw ≤ aS for all w ∈ ZS}. 2
4The introduction of X
−
i is superﬂuous if only nonnegative demands are possible.
9Let Γ be a general newsvendor situation. The associated forced allocation game






S) for all S ⊆ N.
This deﬁnition implies that vΓ(S) is the maximum expected proﬁt that coalition S
can obtain by coordinating orders and allocations. Since we are forcing the orders to be
transferred to the retailers by restricting the feasible set of possible allocations MS(qS)
with constraint
P
i∈S Awi = qS
w for all w ∈ ZS, we refer to this game as forced allocation
game.
The following example illustrates the forced allocation game associated with a simple
general newsvendor situation.
Example 3.2 Consider the 2-person newsvendor situation Γ = (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,
(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N), with N = {1,2}, W = {w1,w2}, kw1 = kw2 = 1, fw1,1 =
fw1,2 = fw2,1 = fw2,2 = 1, Z1 = {w1}, Z2 = {w2}, p1 = p2 = 6, and independent
stochastic demands X1 and X2 deﬁned by the same probability mass function




0 if x / ∈ {1,2}
1
2 if x = 1
1
2 if x = 2.
The optimization problem for one person coalitions S = {1} and S = {2} is the same







The symmetry in costs and selling prices result in optimal order vectors q ∈ I R
W with
qw1 + qw2 = 3 for coalition {1,2}. Let q∗ be such an order vector. The expected optimal





{1,2}) = −3 ∗ 1 +
1
4
(12 − 3) +
1
2
(18 − 3) +
1
4




Note that since we are considering a forced allocation game, for every demand real-
ization we should send all ordered units to the retailer. Therefore, the transportation
cost from warehouse to the retailer appears as 3 in the last tree terms of the expected
proﬁt function for coalition {1,2}.






0 if S = ∅;
5 if |S| = 1;
101
2 if S = N.
Note that this newsvendor game is balanced, i.e., it has a non-empty core, since any
y ∈ I R
2 with y1 ≥ 5, y2 ≥ 5 and y1 + y2 = 101




In the following part of this section, we will prove that force allocation games have a
nonempty core by showing that these games are balanced. The following lemma shows
a relation between the expected proﬁt functions of the grand coalition and of a balanced
collection of subcoalitions, which will be used to prove that the forced allocation game is
balanced.
10Lemma 3 Let (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N) be a general news-
vendor situation. Let κ be an associated balanced map. Denote an optimal order vector

























Proof : First, note that the total transportation costs of goods from the supplier to


























Let xN be a demand realization vector for the grand coalition and let xS be the asso-
ciated demand vector of any coalition S ⊂ N. As before, denote an allocation of qS,∗ that
maximizes the proﬁt of coalition S for demand realization xS by AS,∗. Furthermore, let










































































The ﬁrst inequality holds since BN,∗ is an optimal allocation for the grand coalition for
order vector
P




S⊆N:S6=∅ κ(S)AS,∗ is a possible allocation in MN(
P
S⊆N:S6=∅ κ(S)qS,∗). The second in-
equality holds since the transportation costs from the warehouses to the retailers are the





































for all i ∈ N, which means that every retailer in the grand coalition sells at least as
much units as the balanced sum of sales that he could make in the balanced collection









any AS, which implies that λAS,∗ is an optimal allocation for the order demand pairs
λqS,∗,λxS.
Since this inequality holds for any realization xN of XN, taking expectations proves
that Equation (5) holds. This completes the proof. 2
Using the properties of the proﬁt function shown in Lemma 3, we show that forced
allocation games are balanced in the following theorem.
11Theorem 3 Let Γ = (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N) be a gen-
eral news-vendor situation. The associated forced allocation game (N,vΓ) is balanced.
Proof : Let κ : 2N/{∅} −→ [0,1] be a balanced map. Recall that XN = (Xi)i∈N and,
for all i ∈ N, note that
P
S⊆N:S6=∅ κ(S)XS
i = Xi since κ is a balanced map.
Let (qS,∗)S⊆N:S6=∅ be optimal order vectors for the diﬀerent coalitions. Then, zN de-
ﬁned by zN =
P
S⊆N:S6=∅ κ(S)qS,∗ denotes a possible order vector for coalition N, while
qN,∗ is the optimal order vector. Hence, we know that πN(qN,∗,XN) ≥ πN(zN,XN). Fur-
thermore, for all S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅ it holds that κ(S)qS,∗ maximizes proﬁt πS(·,κ(S)XS)
since πS(λq,λX) = λπS(q,X) for any stochastic demand vector X of coalition S and any

















































The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that qN,∗ is the optimal order vector of the
grand coalition. The second inequality holds because of Lemma 3. The third equality
holds because πS is homogeneous of degree one. We conclude that the associated game
is balanced. 2
From Shapley (1967) and Bondareva (1963), the following corollary follows immedi-
ately.
Corollary 1 Let (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N) be a general news-
vendor situation. The associated forced allocation game has a non-empty core.
Since every subgame of a forced allocation game associated with a general news-vendor
situation is a forced allocation game itself, the following corollary follows immediately
from Theorem 3.
Corollary 2 Let (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N) be a general news-
vendor situation with warehouses. The associated forced allocation game is totaly bal-
anced.
4 Relaxed Allocation Game
In this section, we drop the assumption of sending all units to the retailers. In other
words, we allow the warehouses to have stock at the end of the selling period. By
dropping this assumption, we actually change the allocation problem that cooperating
retailers solve following demand realization. Consequently, we are considering a new
game, which we call the relaxed allocation game.
12In this section, we show that the core of the associated relaxed allocation game is
non-empty as well. We will ﬁrst introduce the relaxed allocation game formally. Then,
we will deﬁne a new related newsvendor situation. After creating a relation between
the relaxed allocation game and the forced allocation game associated with a general
newsvendor situation and its related newsvendor situation, respectively, we can easily
prove that the core of the relaxed allocation game is nonempty as well.
Consider a general newsvendor situation Γ = (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,
(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N). By dropping the assumption of the previous section to send all units
of goods to the retailers at the end of the period, we actually enlarge the set of possible
allocations MS(qS). An allocation of qS is a matrix ˆ AS with
ˆ Awi = 0 if i ∈ N/S or w ∈ W/ZS ;
P
i∈S
ˆ Awi ≤ qS
w for all w ∈ ZS.
The set of all such possible allocations of order is denoted by ˆ MS(qS). In line with
notation in the previous section, let ˆ hS( ˆ AS,qS,xS) be the total transportation costs
from the warehouses to the retailers if transportation takes place according to allocation
ˆ AS ∈ ˆ MS(qS). Note that ˆ hS coincides with hS, but they are deﬁned on diﬀerent domains.
Let ˆ P S( ˆ AS,qS,xS) be the proﬁt of the coalition S for an allocation ˆ AS ∈ ˆ MS(qS) under
order vector qS and demand realization vector xS. Similarly, ˆ P is similar to P but we
consider the allocations in ˆ MS(qS) instead of MS(qS). Finally, let ˆ πS(qS,XS) be the
expected proﬁt function of coalition S.






S) for all S ⊆ N.
The following example illustrates the relaxed allocation game associated with the
newsvendor situation in Example 3.2.
Example 4.1 Consider the 2-person newsvendor situation Γ = (N,W,(Xi)i∈N,(kw)w∈W,
(fwi)w∈W,i∈N,(Zi)i∈N,(pi)i∈N), introduced in Example 3.2. Under the assumption that
we do not need to send all ordered units to the retailers, the optimization problem for
coalition S = {1} is similar to a newsvendor problem with overage cost co = 1, underage
cost cu = 4 and stochastic demand X1. Since in the relaxed allocation game it is allowed
to keep the excess units at the warehouses, the overage cost of excess units appears as
1, which is only the transportation cost from the supplier to the warehouses. Then, the




{1}(2,X1) = −2 ∗ 1 +
1
2
(6 − 1) +
1
2
(12 − 2) = 5.5 .
Repeating the same argument, we come up with the optimal order quantity 2 and ex-
pected proﬁt π{2}(2,X2) = 5.5 for coalition S = {2}. The symmetry in costs and selling
prices results in the optimal order vectors q ∈ I R
W with qw1 +qw2 = 4 for coalition {1,2}.





∗,X1,2) = −4 ∗ 1 +
1
4
(12 − 2) +
1
2
(18 − 3) +
1
4
(24 − 4) = 11 .
5The relaxed allocation game (N, ˆ vΓ) is well deﬁned, since the existence of the optimal allocation and
optimal order vectors can be shown similarly as in the previous chapter.






0 if S = ∅;
5.5 if |S| = 1;
11 if S = N.
Note that this newsvendor game is balanced, i.e., it has a non-empty core, since
y = (5.5,5.5) belongs to the core.
3
In the following part of the paper, we deﬁne a related newsvendor situation and
consider the forced allocation game associated with this newsvendor situation. We will
use this forced allocation game and Corollary 1 to prove that the cores of the relaxed
allocation games associated with general newsvendor situation is nonempty .
Let Γ be a general newsvendor situation. The related situation of Γ is deﬁned as
Γ
0 := (N ∪ ¯ N,W,(Xi)i∈N∪ ¯ N,(kw)w∈W,(fwi)w∈W,i∈N∪ ¯ N,(Zi)i∈N∪ ¯ N,(pi)i∈N∪ ¯ N). Here ¯ N :=
{¯ 1,..., ¯ n} represents a set of phantom retailers. In this situation, each retailer i has a
phantom retailer¯ ı with the same set of warehouses that it works with, zero transportation
cost (fwi = 0, ∀w ∈ W, i ∈ ¯ N), zero selling price (pi = 0 ∀i ∈ ¯ N) and zero demand
(Xi = 0 ∀i ∈ ¯ N). These phantom retailers work as trash cans with zero cost for the
unsold product in the system. The other parameters are the same as in Γ. In the
following part of the paper, ¯ S denotes the set of phantom retailers corresponding to a
coalition S. Now consider the forced allocation game associated with Γ
0. Recall that in
this forced allocation game, an allocation matrix AR of a coalition R ⊆ N ∪ ¯ N is in the
set
MR(qR) := {A ∈ I RW∗N∪ ¯ N




w for all w ∈ ZR}.
Furthermore, the forced allocation game associated with Γ











R) for all R ⊆ N ∪ ¯ N.
The following lemma shows a relation between forced allocation games and relaxed
allocation games.
Lemma 4 Let Γ be a general newsvendor situation and let Γ






(S ∪ ¯ S) for all S ⊆ N
Proof : Consider a coalition S ⊆ N and its corresponding coalition S ∪ ¯ S. Note
that the set of possible orders is the same for coalition S in Γ and for coalition S ∪ ¯ S
in Γ
0, since ZS = Z¯ S = ZS∪¯ S. In other words, QS = QS∪¯ S. Additionally, any possible
demand realization vector xS in Γ can be identiﬁed where xS∪¯ S = (xS∪¯ S)i∈S∪¯ S in Γ0
with xS∪¯ S
i = xS
i if i ∈ S and xS∪¯ S
i = 0 if i ∈ ¯ S. Note that this deﬁnes a one-to-one
correspondence between possible demand realization vectors in Γ and Γ
0 for coalitions S
and S ∪ ¯ S, respectively, since the demands for all phantom retailers are deﬁned as zero
in Γ
0.
14Consider an order vector q ∈ QS = QS∪¯ S, a demand realization xS ∈ XS and its
corresponding realization xS∪¯ S ∈ XS∪¯ S. Furthermore, consider an allocation ˆ AS ∈ ˆ MS(q)





































































It is easy to show that:
• For all ˆ AS ∈ ˆ MS(q) there exists AS∪¯ S ∈ MS∪¯ S(q) such that ˆ hS( ˆ AS,q,xS) =
hS∪¯ S(AS∪¯ S,q,xS∪¯ S) (*)
and
• For all AS∪¯ S ∈ MS∪¯ S(q) there exists ˆ AS ∈ ˆ MS(q) such that hS∪¯ S(AS∪¯ S,q,xS∪¯ S) =
ˆ hS( ˆ AS,q,xS) (**)
Let ˆ AS,∗ and AS∪¯ S,∗ be optimal allocation matrices for the forced allocation game and





























































where the second equality holds since XS
i = XS∪¯ S
i for all i ∈ N and X
¯ S
i = 0 for all i ∈ ¯ N.













(S ∪ ¯ S).
2
In the following theorem, we show that the relaxed allocation game has a non-empty
core.
Theorem 4 Let Γ be a general news-vendor situation. The associated relaxed allocation
game has a non-empty core.
Proof : Let Γ
0 be the related newsvendor situation and let (N ∪ ¯ N,vΓ
0
) be the forced
allocation game associated with Γ
0. From Corollary 1, we know that the core of the
forced allocation game is non-empty. Consider a payoﬀ vector z ∈ C(N ∪ ¯ N,vΓ
0
). Deﬁne
payoﬀ vector y for the relaxed allocation game (N, ˆ vΓ) by yi = zi + z¯ ı ∀ i ∈ N, where













(N ∪ ¯ N) = ˆ v
Γ(N).
The second equality holds since z ∈ C(N ∪ ¯ N,vΓ
0
), and the last equality follows from













(S ∪ ¯ S) = ˆ v
Γ(S), for all S ⊂ N.
The inequality holds since z ∈ C(N,∪ ¯ N,vΓ
0
), and the last equality holds by Lemma 4.
2
Similar to the forced allocation games, the relaxed allocation games are totally bal-
anced as well.
5 Remarks and Future Research
In this work, we conducted a game-theoretical analysis of a distribution structure with
warehouses, in which retailers have an opportunity of reallocating their orders after de-
mands are realized and they can coordinate their orders accordingly. Slikker et al.(2003)
studied a situation without warehouses but with positive transshipment costs and showed
that a stable division of expected proﬁts exists. This study considered a general model
related to a distribution structure with warehouses. We showed that a stable division of
expected proﬁts exists in either of two games deﬁned in this setting.
The generality of the model arises from the cost network we utilized. The two step
cost structure (kw and fw,i) and ﬂexible number of available warehouses allow us to
analyze diﬀerent systems between two extreme cases, in which the allocation of the
16ordered products takes place at the retailer level (only lateral transshipment) and at the
supplier level.
In this study, we do not explicitly include the salvage value of the product in the
model. However, it can be easily incorporated into the model just by resetting the selling
prices and transportation costs properly for both of the games considered.
There are several potential directions of future research. One of them is to relax the
assumption that the actual demand is known with certainty at the point of time the
orders are reallocated. A second one is to consider risk seeking or risk averse natures of
players. Stochastic game theory can provide us with the necessary framework to make
an analysis where the players have diﬀerent attitudes and preferences.
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